An Israel-Turkey-Hamas triangle?

.: June 25, 2015

In the article the author broad the possibilities that could lead triangulaire relationships between Israel, Turkey and the Hamas; even indirectly.

It’s safe to assume that talks between top-level Turkish, Israeli diplomats are not just about improving ties Israel’s diplomatic ties with Turkey go back to 1949. But the relationship soon foundered with Israel’s 1956 war with Egypt and it was only two years later, following meetings in Rome between former Israeli ambassador to Italy, Eliahu Sasson, and associates of former Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, that the sides agreed on the need to end the crisis and downgrade the Turkish mission in Tel Aviv. The talks led to a recovery in the relationship and David Ben Gurion, on a secret visit to Ankara, signed the famous "alliance of the periphery," a cooperation agreement which included Iran, Turkey, Israel and Ethiopia.

A complicated history

Over the years, relations have had their ups and downs. Are they now on an upswing after the Rome meeting between Israeli Foreign Ministry Director General Dore Gold and Feridun Sinirlioğlu, his Turkish counterpart? Does anyone in the two foreign ministries even remember that Rome was an important stepping stone for improved ties between the two countries 57 years ago? An educated guess would point to the fact that Gold and Sinirlioğlu did not limit their conversation to the amount of compensation Israel would pay the families of the nine Turks killed and those who were wounded when Israeli soldiers boarded the Mavi Marmara in 2010 to prevent the activists on board from breaking through the Israeli blockade of Gaza. "An undated image taken from the Free Gaza Movement website on May 28, 2010, shows the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara which took part in the Freedom Flotilla to the Gaza Strip"

At a time when Israel is under a wave of international attacks and Turkey is entering intense coalition talks on a new government, the outcome of which is unclear, something broader and more important brought the two officials to Rome. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is still in charge of Turkish-Israeli affairs in Ankara. Erdogan has for years been pushing insistently for a lifting of the Israeli blockade on Gaza. He’s obsessed with it since "Operation Cast Lead" (January 2009), and the mission of the Mavi Marmara flotilla was only one indication of this. During all the discussions about Israeli compensation for the victims, before Netanyahu’s apology to Erdogan in March 2013 and after it, the lifting of the blockade has consistently been the top Turkish demand.

Israel’s 2014 war with Gaza, dubbed Operation Protective Edge, revived discussions on the blockade issue. In recent weeks rumors have been circulating that Gaza’s Hamas rulers and Israel have been exploring a UN; proposed five-year truce; in exchange for Israeli agreement to the constriction of a seaport in Gaza. Erdogan is unlikely to ignore such an opportunity (even if it is only a rumor). The Turks spared no effort in recent years to help the Gaza Strip; including the transfer of Palestinians wounded in last summer’s war to hospitals in Turkey. Erdogan has also made no secret of his affection for the Islamist Hamas, preferring it to its older and more moderate Palestinian sister, Fatah.

The political midpoint of Gaza

One might not be too far off in assuming that Turkey offered Israel a deal; a seaport in Gaza for the return of the Turkish ambassador who was withdrawn from Tel Aviv in 2010. Israel, for its part, might not reject such a proposal out of hand. "Israeli troops leave Gaza after Operation Protective Edge, August 6, 2014" Moreover, the Gaza port deal would shift attention from Israel’s control of the West Bank, which has been making world headlines, to Gaza. Such a Turkish-Israeli-Hamas deal would embarrass Palestinian Authority and Fatah chairman Mahmoud Abbas. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu knows well that a French proposal to recognize a Palestinian state awaits him at the UN General Assembly in September, assuming that by then Iran and the P5+1 sign the agreement on the Iranian nuclear program.

An Israeli quid pro quo with Turkey, which in Jerusalem would not be described as a deal with Hamas, would bring back the Turkish ambassador, who would be joining his recently appointed peer from Egypt as well as Jordan’s ambassador. After five or six years of strained diplomatic ties with these three Muslim states, this could be portrayed as a coup for Netanyahu and his policies. It would allow him, quite rightly, to point to the formation of a moderate Muslim axis against radical Islam and present France and its supporters as more Muslim and Arab than the Muslims themselves. Netanyahu’s coalition is unlikely to object too strenuously to such a deal, even if it involves Hamas, given that it would ease international pressure on the issue of West Bank settlements. Netanyahu might even be able to sneak in approval for the construction of 1,000 housing units in Ma’aleh Adumim, the Jewish West Bank town near Jerusalem, giving in to demands by former Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, who has conditioned his return to the government on such construction. Would Netanyahu miss such a golden opportunity?

Alon LIEL © I24News (Israel)

Alon Liel, formerly director-general of the Israeli ministry of foreign affairs, is one of the instigators of an Israeli campaign to advance recognition of a Palestinian state by European parliaments.